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Introduction and rhetorical theory 
 
Aristotle states in the Rhetoric – the most comprehensive surviving rhetorical treatise from 
Classical Greece – that there are three modes of persuasion: logical reasoning (logos), arguments 
from character (êthos), and ‘putting the hearer into a certain frame of mind’ (Rh. 1.2, 1356a1-4: 
ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναί πως), which he confirms shortly after (1356a14-15) means by 
emotion (pathos).  He later tells us that when people change in respect of their emotions, they 
change their judgments (2.1, 1378a19-20: ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη δι’ ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι 
πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις).1  He goes on (Rh. 2.2-11) to discuss a somewhat idiosyncratic list of emotions 
that can usefully be aroused in oratory.  These include anger (orgê) and calming down (praünsis), 
friendship (philia) and hatred (misos), fear (phobos) and confidence (tharsos), shame (aischunê) 
and shamelessness (anaischuntia), gratitude (charin echein) and ingratitude (acharistein),2 pity 
(eleos), indignation (nemesan), envy (phthonos), emulation (zêlos) and scorn (kataphronêsis),3 
and a number of minor described but unnamed emotions. 
Aristotle famously divides speeches into three types – forensic (courtroom), deliberative 
(e.g. Assembly/Council), and epideictic (display) – but he does not give any explicit advice as to 
which emotions are most appropriate for each type of speech.  His near contemporary 
Anaximenes, in the Rhetoric to Alexander,4 is more helpful.  In a chapter dealing with forensic 
oratory, he says that six emotions are particularly pertinent: three friendly emotions (pity, 
gratitude and goodwill – the last similar to Aristotle’s friendship) for ourselves, and three hostile 
emotions (hatred, anger and envy) for our opponent (Rh. Al. 36, 1444b35-45a18).5  This is 
reasonable: trials concern what people have done in the past; anger and gratitude are aroused by 
                                                 
I should like to thank the Leverhulme Trust for funding the research project from which this chapter derives, and 
Chris Kremmydas for his very helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. 
1 The sophist and rhetorician Gorgias, in his Encomium to Helen, agrees: ‘Speech is a powerful lord that … can 
banish fear and remove grief and instill pleasure and enhance pity’ (8); ‘The power of speech has the same effect on 
the condition of the soul as the application of drugs to the state of bodies; for just as different drugs dispel different 
fluids from the body, and some bring an end to disease but others end life, so also some speeches cause pain, some 
pleasure, some fear; some instill courage, some drug and bewitch the soul with a kind of evil persuasion’ (14); tr. 
Kennedy (2007) 253-4. 
2 Agreeing with Konstan (2006) 156-68 that these are the emotions discussed, rather than kindness (charis) and 
unkindness as favoured by most previous scholars, e.g. Grimaldi (1988) 128.  Cope (1877) II.89 agrees with 
gratitude. 
3 I prefer scorn to the usual contempt, which I think is a mistranslation here.  Aristotle describes contempt elsewhere, 
when he says kataphronêsis is treating someone as if they are of no account (2.2, 1378b14-17). Here it means a 
disdainful desire not to be, or have something, like someone else (Rh. 2.11, 1388b22-8) – hence contrary to 
emulation.  English scorn covers both (contemptuous and disdainful) senses of kataphronêsis.  The contemptuous 
version will appear below (main text).  On different emotion scripts included within one word, see Kaster (2005) and 
Sanders (2014). 
4 This treatise is contained within the Aristotelian corpus.  Its attribution to Anaximenes of Lampsacus is long-
standing and probable, though the author’s identity is irrelevant to my argument. 
5 Note that Anaximenes uses eu diatithenai for goodwill here – and elsewhere eumeneia (36, 1441b36-42a7) and 
philia (34, 1439b17) as well as eunoia (29, 1436b16-37).  Eunoia is the term regularly used in the Attic corpus to 
request goodwill.  I discuss Anaximenes’ goodwill (various terms) and its relationship to Aristotle’s philia in 
Sanders (forthcoming).  For both Anaximenes’ and Aristotle’s lists of emotions, cf. Winter (this volume). 
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specific past actions, while the other four emotions respond to present impressions created by 
past actions.  A large amount of scholarship has been published on these emotions in Attic 
oratory, and the evidence cited is overwhelmingly – usually entirely – from forensic speeches.6 
Accordingly, it is a useful shorthand to consider these six as ‘forensic emotions’, and I 
refer to them as such below.  This does not mean that they are the only emotions aroused in 
forensic oratory, or that they do not appear in other forms of oratory; rather, that they are the six 
emotions most commonly associated with judging.  Cases in the Athenian lawcourts were 
sometimes quasi-deliberative, when the lawcourt substituted for the Assembly (e.g. the various 
Lysias speeches concerned with upholding the post-403 amnesty, or Demosthenes’ attempt to 
overturn Leptines’ law in Against Leptines), and in these cases other, ‘deliberative emotions’ 
could come into play as well. 
So what are the emotions most associated with deliberation?  Here Anaximenes is less 
helpful.7  In his chapter dealing with deliberative oratory, he discusses the same six emotions as 
he does for forensic oratory (Rh. Al. 34, 1439b15-17).  This is not completely wrong: just as 
some forensic speeches also have a quasi-deliberative function, some deliberative speeches have 
a quasi-forensic one – for instance in Thucydides, Sthenelaidas’ angry speech urging Sparta to 
war to punish Athenian aggression (1.86), or Cleon’s speech arousing anger and seeking 
punishment for Mytilene for rebelling (3.37-40).8  Some Thucydidean speeches completely blur 
the boundaries between the two types of oratory – e.g. at Plataea’s ‘trial’ by Spartan generals, 
which has both political and judicial implications, the Plataeans attempt to arouse pity (3.53-9), 
and the Thebans attempt to quash it and arouse anger in its place (3.61-7).  In the Plataean speech 
(and elsewhere) there are also occasions when a speaker says his listeners should aid a city 
because they were aided by them in the past – deliberative policy informed by gratitude or 
goodwill.9  However, these are relatively uncommon examples, which do not account for most of 
the emotional arguments of the large majority of deliberative speeches, whether in Thucydides or 
in the Attic corpus. 
Returning to Aristotle, and reading between his lines, we find that we can piece together 
some advice on the emotions appropriate to deliberative oratory.  He argues that the three types 
of rhetoric (forensic, deliberative and epideictic) refer to three different time periods, and that 
deliberative oratory refers to the future (Rh. 1.3, 1358a36-b20).  This is reasonable, as those 
deliberating and taking decisions will aim to affect future events.  Accordingly, I believe 
                                                 
6 e.g. Johnstone (1999) 109-25 on pity; Allen (2000) and (2003) on anger; Rubinstein (2000) 212-31 on gratitude; 
Fisher (2003) and Cairns (2003) on envy; Kurihara (2003) on hatred; Rubinstein (2004) on anger and hatred; Bers 
(2009) 77-98 on pity; Sanders (2012) on anger, hatred and envy; Rubinstein (2014) on anger and pity; Sanders 
(forthcoming) on goodwill.  Carey (1996) devotes half a page (406) to emotional arguments in deliberative oratory 
(in both the Attic corpus and Thucydides), following a longer discussion of forensic speeches.  Konstan (2010) on 
rhetoric and emotion mostly discusses rhetoricians, the few examples from actual speeches all being forensic. 
7 As are modern scholars – see previous note.  Hesk (2009) 147-50 and Usher (2010) on deliberative oratory, and 
Fox and Livingston (2010) on rhetoric and historiography, barely mention emotions.  Hunt (2010), on deliberative 
debate in Demosthenes’ period, sometimes states that arguments – e.g. involving familial relations (108), the state 
being at risk (139), or farms being burned (141-2) – would have been emotionally laden; occasionally he identifies 
specific emotions – e.g. that Athenians would feel shame and outrage at being compared to slaves (115), or shame 
and anger at those who threatened their womenfolk (147-8).  Debnar (2001), on Thucydidean speeches to Spartan 
audiences, occasionally mentions specific emotions but without elaboration, e.g.: ‘there is evidence enough in 
Sthenelaïdas’ speech of the role that passions played in bringing about the war.  He deftly appeals to Spartan pride as 
well as to the fear of growing Athenian power’ (76).  Pelling (2012) 289-96 also briefly discusses some emotions 
(mainly pity) in some Thucydidean speeches. 
8 On Cleon’s quasi-forensic argumentation throughout this speech, see Fulkerson (2008) and Harris (2013) 97-104. 
9 On goodwill in Greek interstate relations, see Mitchell (1997) and Low (2007) 51-3, 155. 
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Aristotle is indirectly counselling that we should expect emotions that are directed towards the 
future to be most suitable to this sort of oratory. 
We have already seen that the six ‘forensic emotions’ refer either to past actions or 
present impressions arising from past actions.  If we look at Aristotle’s definitions of other 
emotions, we find that several of them do appear to be future-directed.  Fear, he tells us, relates to 
some destructive or painful future evil (Rh. 2.5, 1382a21-2: ἔστω δὴ ὁ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ 
ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ).  Confidence is also future-directed, being 
hope with imagination (2.5, 1383a16-19: τό τε γὰρ θάρσος τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ <φόβῳ…, ὥστε μετὰ 
φαντασίας ἡ ἐλπὶς τῶν σωτηρίων ὡς ἐγγὺς ὄντων).10  These emotions should therefore be 
particularly applicable to deliberative speeches.  Shame – a concern about falling into disrepute – 
relates to things present, past and future (2.6, 1383b12-14: ἔστω δὴ αἰσχύνη λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ 
περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν, ἢ παρόντων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων), and so 
should apply to all three types of speech.  Aristotle does not discuss pride – one of his more 
obvious omissions – but clearly a concern with our continued good repute will be as pertinent to 
deliberative speech as shame.11  These observations by Aristotle all seem reasonable, and lead me 
to posit fear, confidence, hope, shame and pride as emotions particularly pertinent to deliberative 
oratory – i.e. the emotions that should principally be aroused in order to persuade those 
deliberating to choose a particular course of action.  So, let us turn to actual deliberative 
speeches, and see if this is indeed the case. 
 
Deliberative speeches in the Attic oratorical corpus 
 
In the Attic corpus, deliberative speeches overwhelmingly means Demosthenes, but not 
exclusively,12 and the fact that we have speeches by several authors will lend stronger weight to 
my conclusions.  We should note that there are sections of all deliberative speeches that do not 
obviously use emotional arguments at all – they either describe the current political situation, or 
offer advice, or use other types of rhetorical argument.13  Some speeches use emotional 
arguments very little, while others use them a lot.  While I will refer to a range of speeches, I 
structure my discussion around the three Olynthiacs.14  This is partly because their emotional 
arguments are particularly detailed, and cover a larger than usual proportion of the speeches.  But 
in addition, the fact that we have three speeches all written by the same author and delivered 
                                                 
10 While hope and confidence overlap to a large extent in English, such divergence as they have seems to be that 
hope suggests the strong desirability of a certain outcome, while confidence suggests a strong expectation of that 
outcome.  This distinction may or may not be reflected in ancient Greek, but here at any rate I follow Aristotle in 
considering them two aspects of the same emotion.  As in Aristotle, fear is the opposite of both hope and confidence 
(as I distinguish them) in English. 
11 Orators sometimes explicitly ‘flag’ (i.e. label) the emotions they are trying to arouse, but not always.  Some 
emotions lend themselves to explicit exhortation only in certain circumstances – see e.g. Rubinstein (2004) on anger 
and hatred; Sanders (forthcoming) on goodwill.  Others do not lend themselves to explicit mention but can only be 
aroused covertly (i.e. without labelling) – see e.g. Sanders (2014) 79-99 on envy.  This is not the place to consider 
this question at length, but it would appear that fear is less often, confidence and shame more often, ‘flagged’ by the 
speaker as the emotion sought.  (Pride cannot be flagged as it has no label in Classical Greek – though there are 
many for being arrogantly over-proud.)  Where emotions are not ‘flagged’, we must rely on comparing the 
arguments used with those Arist. Rh. 2.2-11 associates with each emotion, and our own common sense. 
12 Dem. 1-10 and 13-17 are deliberative speeches (11 and 12 are letters or tracts, written for publication rather than 
the Assembly).  Dem. 7 is certainly, Dem. 17 almost certainly, and Dem. 13 possibly pseudonymously attributed; 
Dem. 10’s authenticity was once disputed, but is now generally accepted – see Trevett (2011) 113, 177-8, 224, 287-
8; MacDowell (2009) 226-7, 344, 355, 380-1.  The only other deliberative speech in the Attic corpus is Andoc. 3. 
13 Emotional arguments can also interact with other (i.e. logos or êthos) arguments. 
14 Though I take them out of order, for thematic reasons. 
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within a short time period in very similar circumstances, strongly suggests that speakers would 
have had a range of emotional arguments they could choose from, and situations did not 
necessarily demand one specific emotional response.  In these three speeches, we can see 
Demosthenes almost experimenting with which emotional arguments might have the best effect. 
In the First Olynthiac, Demosthenes sets the tone early for the emotional response he 
wants: he says the most especial reason Athenians have for fear (1.3: ὡς ἔστι μάλιστα τοῦτο δέος) 
is that Philip will wrest from them something of theirs.  Philip attacked Olynthus, and the 
Olynthians now both hate and fear him (1.7: ἐπειδὴ δ’ ἐκ τῶν πρὸς αὑτοὺς ἐγκλημάτων μισοῦσι, 
βεβαίαν εἰκὸς τὴν ἔχθραν αὐτοὺς ὑπὲρ ὧν φοβοῦνται καὶ πεπόνθασιν ἔχειν) – sc. these being the 
right emotions on incurring Philip’s interest. After a long exposition of the current 
political/military situation, Demosthenes express his fears for the future if Philip is allowed to 
succeed: Athenians should consider what he has done so far; he will gain more and more, while 
we (Athens) lose more and more; by nature Philip cannot rest on his laurels; he will come closer 
and closer, right up to Attica (1.12-15).  After offering some advice, Demosthenes then arouses 
confidence or hope that something can be done: he argues that things are not as good for Philip as 
they seem; he expected a swift victory, but that has not happened; the Thessalians no longer 
cooperate with him, depriving him of money; he will therefore find it harder and harder to pay his 
mercenaries; others he has conquered may also be induced to rebel; and he concludes by saying 
that Philip’s difficulty is Athens’s opportunity (1.21-4).  He then switches back to fear: Athens 
will have to fight either in Olynthus or here, and Athenians should consider the comparative 
detriments of fighting in each place; if he comes to Athens, the Thebans will join him; the 
financial losses of fighting in Attica would be huge, and Attica’s farms would be devastated 
(1.25-7). 
Fear turns out to be a particularly common emotion in deliberative speeches.  While some 
speeches in the Demosthenic corpus use very little emotional argumentation, where emotions are 
aroused we find fear is the most frequent emotion played to.  In the Third Olynthiac 
Demosthenes says he has no small fear (3.8: οὐδε τὸν φόβον ... μικρὸν ὁρῶ) and then briefly 
rehashes arguments from the First Olynthiac that Thebes hates Athens, while their ally Phocis 
has no money; if Philip comes to Attica, Athens will be in great danger; and that danger will be 
on their doorstep, and so great that Athens will have to ask for others’ assistance, rather than 
providing it as they could in Olynthus (3.8-9).  In On the Peace he arouses fears of all Athens’s 
enemies joining together at once (5.17-19).  The Second Philippic worries at length about Philip’s 
tendency to continual encroachment (6.20-25).  The pseudo-Demosthenic On Halonnesus raises 
the spectre of Macedonia becoming a sea power (7.14-16).  And in the Third Philippic 
Demosthenes tries to make his audience feel fear by stressing that the danger is right here, right 
now; lists the dangers should war break out (9.17-18); and details Philip’s military innovations 
(9.49-51). 
Fear arguments are particularly prevalent in On the Chersonese.  Early in the speech 
Demosthenes says that doing nothing is not pious, raising a fear of the gods’ disapproval, and 
also not safe; he worries about Athens displaying the same behaviour that caused the present 
disaster; and he talks of Macedonia’s standing army and Philip’s pre-planning, in contrast to 
Athens’s continual unreadiness (8.8-12).  He says that disbanding the army is against Athens’s 
interests, there are dangers in putting off a decision till later, and they will be forced to surrender 
the Hellespont to Philip (8.17-18).   He argues that all Philip’s actions are aimed directly at 
Athens’s democratic constitution, and its power, interests and possessions, which he wants for 
himself (8.39-45). Most of these arguments are repeated later in the speech, as well as a concern 
that some Athenian politicians will betray the city to Philip (8.55-63). 
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Lest one object that the rise of Philip was a uniquely dangerous period and perhaps that is 
what led to a greater prevalence of fear arguments, a brief look at speeches prior to his rise – or 
before its effects on Athens became clear – will show that this is not the case.  Demosthenes’ On 
Organisation arouses fear at Athens losing its allies while it fails to organise (13.7-8), being 
found militarily unready when eventually it needs to fight (13.11), and at its democracy being 
undermined (13.14-15).  On the Freedom of the Rhodians talks of untrustworthy alliances with 
oligarchs, and oligarchs threatening Athens’ democratic constitution (15.18-19).  And decades 
earlier, Andocides’ On the Peace with Sparta at great length suppresses fear of a risk to the 
democratic constitution if they make peace (3.1-12), and arouses it at the thought of Persia 
stepping in militarily should Athens defeat Sparta (3.15), or of losing Athens’ strongest ally 
(Boeotia) to stick with a weak one (Argos; 3.26-8).  And he concludes with a warning (with 
examples – induction strengthening the argument) that every time Athens has chosen war instead 
of peace it has suffered disaster (3.30-2).  This is the one deliberative speech in the Attic corpus 
written long before the rise of Macedonia, and we still find it dominated emotionally by attempts 
to suppress and arouse fear. 
Hope and confidence arguments are considerably less frequent than fear ones.  For hope, 
we can postulate that one normally needs to arouse fear before one can give reasons to hope, and 
indeed it is rare in Attic oratory that we see hope arguments without first seeing fear ones.  This 
is not necessarily the case with confidence, but perhaps Athens’s chronic naval and military 
weaknesses in Demosthenes’ politically active period suggests why this emotion appears less 
frequently (as we shall see, it is far more common in Thucydides).15 
As well as the hope arguments seen in the First Olynthiac (1.21-4, as above), the Second 
Olynthiac argues that Philip has treated far too many allies shamefully and this will come back to 
bite him (2.8-10); if Demosthenes’ advice is followed, Philip’s alliances will crumble and he will 
be left isolated, and on its own Macedonia is weak; his subjects will realise they have no share in 
his glory, but only the sufferings of his constant campaigns (2.13-16).  The First Philippic refers 
to Athenians’ despair and hopelessness (4.2: οὐκ ἀθυμητέον … οὐδ’ εἰ πάνυ φαύλως ἔχειν 
δοκεῖ), and Demosthenes argues that the rationale for their past despair should become one for 
future hope (4.2: ὃ γάρ ἐστι χείριστον αὐτῶν ἐκ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου, τοῦτο πρὸς τὰ 
μέλλοντα βέλτιστον ὑπάρχει), because: their present situation is only a result of their lack of 
actions, not attempts that have failed; Philip acquired lots of easily conquerable cities that were 
formerly friendly to Athens, and should be easily conquerable in return; and Philip (like anyone 
else) will have allies that hate, fear and envy him (4.2-8).  In a couple of later speeches too, 
Demosthenes repeats some of these arguments, and suggests Athens can hope for victory if it 
follows his advice (8.46-7; 9.5).  Fear and hope arguments occur more widely and more diffusely 
than this, but these are the main passages that play to them at length. 
Turning to the Third Olynthiac, we see some other emotions.  The speech starts with an 
analysis of the situation, then the short section previously mentioned that plays to fear (3.8-9), 
then offered advice.  After this opening, sections 15 to 28 – nearly half of the speech – involve 
arguments that play to civic pride and shame.  The section begins with shame: Demosthenes says 
it is Athenians’ duty to fight, but they are shirking it; they will be dishonoured if Philip captures 
Olynthus; they will have abandoned their land to a barbarian, and deserted on the field of battle 
(3.16-17).  He then starts to interleave with his shaming remarks, claims designed to boost 
Athenians’ pride: he suggests Athenians are prudent and honourable, and will not neglect their 
duties even for no pay; if they’ve fought Greek cities, they will not let a barbarian enslave Greeks 
just because they aren’t paid to fight (3.20). 
                                                 
15 This weakness seems mainly due to the reluctance of Athenians to serve in the navy, and problems with the 
management of operations by ineffective commanders – see Cawkwell (1984). 
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He next moves into full eulogy of Athenians gone by – a line of argument familiar from 
funeral speeches, designed to arouse civic pride and spur contemporaries to live up to the 
supposed great deeds of their ancestors.  Demosthenes compares himself to great statesmen of the 
past (3.21), thus introducing the topic, and goes on to talk of their ancestors’ achievements (3.23-
6): they commanded willing obedience from Greeks for decades; they accumulated a vast amount 
of money; the king of Macedonia was their subject, as is the proper relationship of a barbarian to 
Greeks; they won many battles by land and sea; and their deeds ensured their great renown for 
posterity (3.24).  At home, they used the city’s wealth to build beautiful buildings; they were 
moderate in their way of life, such that those politically active had no better houses than anyone 
else and acted disinterestedly for the common good.  In short, they showed good faith towards 
other Greeks, were pious towards the gods, and had equality amongst themselves (3.25-6).  And 
then, by comparing his contemporaries to their ancestors, he reawakens shame: Athenians have 
been robbed of their own land; they have frittered away vast amounts of money for no gain; they 
have lost in peacetime the allies gained in wartime; and they have trained a great enemy for 
themselves through their actions and inactions (3.27-9).16 
As with fear and hope, arguments designed to arouse shame and pride are not confined to 
this one speech.  In the Second Olynthiac, Demosthenes chides the Athenians for spending the 
entire period of Philip’s rise procrastinating, hoping for others to act, blaming each other, putting 
each other on trial, and hoping some more (2.25).  Early in the First Philippic, he castigates 
Athenians for not doing what is needed, and says that the greatest necessity for free men is shame 
at their current situation (4.10-11).  Later in the same speech he devotes a lengthy section to the 
emotion, saying it is shameful for Athenians to deceive themselves and put off doing 
disagreeable things, constantly being at the mercy of events rather than shaping them (4.38-9); 
they spend forever running around to relieve wherever Philip is attacking, rather than taking the 
war to him (4.40-1); and they are getting a reputation for dishonour and cowardice and all manner 
of other shameful traits, since instead of punishing Philip, Athenians spend all their time trying to 
avoid suffering harm from him (4.42-3); this makes their enemies laugh at them (4.45).  In On the 
Chersonese, Demosthenes mocks all the ineffectual speeches given by this or that politician, 
while Athenians sit on their hands and give Philip free rein to rampage around Greece (8.34-7); 
later in the speech he describes Athens as humiliated and a laughing-stock (8.67).  In the Fourth 
Philippic, he reproves Athenians for acting indolently (10.20), and says that free men feel shame, 
and if they don’t then perhaps it is because they are already slaves (10.27-30); he later calls them 
the idlest (10.49), and says they are bewitched by leisure and tranquillity (10.54).  And shame 
arguments are seen outside the Philip speeches too: in On the Freedom of the Rhodians, 
Demosthenes tells the Athenians they will gain a reputation for being less brave than the Argives, 
and scared of a foreigner and a woman (15.22-3). 
Pride arguments also crop up regularly.  In the Second Olynthiac, Demosthenes lists 
Athens’s achievements and supposed previous good conduct, in: standing up to Sparta in defence 
of justice for all Greeks; repeatedly not taking offered chances for self-aggrandisement; and 
repeatedly spending their money and risking their lives for others (2.24).  The Second Philippic 
contains a long section celebrating the reasons for Philip choosing to ally with Thebes and Argos 
instead of themselves: Philip prefers ambition and universal domination to peace, quietness and 
justice – the traits Athens is famed for; Athens is driven by selflessness, justice and a desire to 
avoid sacrificing other cities for Athens’s gain (6.7-9); Philip judged that Athens would not 
abandon the common justice of Greece and desire for Greece’s goodwill for any amount of profit, 
                                                 
16 The speech continues with a virulent attack on rival politicians – blackening the opponent being more commonly a 
forensic technique, suggested too by the emotions the passage aims to arouse (anger, hatred, envy); see note 20 
below, and further Carey (this volume). 
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not just by considering their current conduct, but also their conduct at the time Persia invaded and 
Athens abandoned their whole land rather than become the greatest power in Greece under 
Persia; also Athens’s fleet is superior to others’ (6.10-12).  In the Fourth Philippic, Demosthenes 
celebrates Athens’s history of opposing oppressors and liberating Greece, and takes pride in their 
ancestral reputation (10.12-14, 73).  And in On Organisation, he again celebrates Athens’s past 
achievements (13.21-2, 26). 
Turning to the Second Olynthiac, we have already seen short passages arousing hope (2.8-
10, 13-16) and civic pride and shame (2.24-5), but its other emotions are more unusual for 
deliberative oratory.  Near the beginning is a section aiming to arouse indignation or anger 
against Philip by rehearsing his past crimes: he breaks oaths, is untrustworthy and base; he said 
he would give Athens Amphipolis, but didn’t; he broke an alliance to hand Potidaea over to the 
Olynthians; he handed over Magnesia to the Thessalians; he habitually pretends friendship with a 
city, then betrays them to another city to win their friendship in turn; he’s shown bad faith to 
everyone he has had dealings with, which shows his own bad character; he’s gained power by 
greed and villainy, and cannot retain it by crime, perjury and lying (2.5-10). 
As in forensic oratory, the listing of someone’s crimes and their ‘labelling’ aim to incite 
indignation, anger or outrage.  Chaniotis has talked about ‘acoustic signals’,17 words whose use – 
especially repeatedly – aims to arouse emotions or impel some other predictable response.  In our 
own culture we might think of politicians or newspapers using words such as ‘scrounger’, 
‘benefit cheat’, ‘rapist’, ‘paedophile’, and in some circles ‘immigrant’ or ‘Tory’ – words the user 
expects to arouse a visceral reaction in a listener or reader.  In Athens it is very likely that words 
such as ‘greed’, ‘villainy’, ‘crime’, ‘perjury’ and ‘lying’ aroused strong hostile reactions from an 
audience.  This is a trick borrowed from forensic oratory, and one Demosthenes was very good 
at.18  In this speech he is attempting to arouse anger at Philip to get Athenians to punish him.  
Anger is by far the most common forensic emotion that we see in deliberative speeches.  Such an 
emotional technique is used in several other extended passages in the Demosthenic corpus in 
relation to Philip,19 and sometimes too Demosthenes attempts to arouse anger against his fellow 
politicians, either for being corrupt and venal or for doing Philip’s bidding.20 
We should be aware that anger is a hierarchical emotion: it is (at least in Greek culture) 
mainly felt by superiors towards inferiors, people they can punish.21  To bolster Demosthenes’ 
argument in the Second Olynthiac that Athenians should see Philip as an inferior (2.5), it is 
perhaps not surprising that contempt is also played with, uniquely in this one same speech in the 
deliberative corpus.22  Philip’s soldiers are described as no better than any others, and indeed 
worse because the best are weeded out; Philip himself is labelled worthless, is depicted as jealous 
of anyone around him of any worth, and a leader of drunk and licentious toadies that consist 
partly of all the most degraded and un-martial people driven out of Athens (2.17-21).  Contempt 
– like indignation – is also felt by superiors towards inferiors, and in this sense they are 
                                                 
17 Chaniotis (2009) 200. 
18 On hostile emotions in Attic forensic oratory, see Sanders (2012).  Kremmydas (2013) 61-2 notes that 
Demosthenes (and others) could attribute mildly derogatory character traits to the dêmos to show how someone had 
manipulated and deceived them, and he postulates this would arouse their anger; one of these traits is euêtheia 
(naivety), which Demosthenes refers to here (2.6: τὴν μὲν ἡμετέραν εὐήθειαν). 
19 Dem. 4.49-50; 9.26-35; [Dem.] 7.32-44. 
20 Dem. 3.29-32; 6.30-4; 8.64-6; 9.53; 10.58-9, 62-3, 75.  Anger is probably not the only hostile emotion that comes 
into play here – hatred is a possible adjunct to anger in all these passages, and in Sanders (2014) 97-8 I argue that 
envy is relevant to Dem. 3.29-32.  See also Carey (this volume). 
21 See Konstan (2006) 61-65 on Hecuba’s (Eur. Hec.) different reactions to the deaths of Polyxena and Polydorus: 
she reluctantly accepts the first out of necessity, but revenges the second because she has the power to do so. 
22 In Thucydides’ deliberative speeches, contempt is seen more often, paired regularly with confidence. 
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functionally distinct from – indeed opposed to – fear, which is felt by inferiors towards 
superiors.23  It should not surprise us either, then, that this is one of the few deliberative speeches 
in which fear arguments do not appear at all. 
We have seen that the range of emotions appealed to in surviving deliberative speeches in 
the Attic corpus is – largely as expected – fear, hope and confidence, civic pride and shame, as 
well as contempt (which involves a lack of fear and high level of confidence), with anger the 
main forensic emotion seen.  However, the range of speeches we have is very limited, coming as 
they almost entirely do from one 25-year period, and mostly from the pen of one man.24 
 
Thucydides’ deliberative speeches at Athens 
 
To test these findings, I compare them to the results of a second, distinct corpus: deliberative 
speeches reported in historiography.  Herodotus and Xenophon are prone to giving speeches in 
précis, and frequently in indirect speech, which does not allow much space for emotional 
arguments to be developed.  Thucydides, however, gives a significant number of orations at 
length, and in direct speech.25  While there are legitimate questions as to how reliably he presents 
speeches,26 my main concern is not so much with whether the arguments used in any particular 
speech are historically accurate, but rather with the types of arguments used in his deliberative 
speeches as a whole.  They would have needed to sound plausible to contemporary readers, and 
therefore we should expect similar sorts of emotional arguments in Thucydides’ speeches, taken 
as a whole, to those his readers would have heard in their own assemblies.  In this light, it is 
notable that his deliberative speeches use a similar palette of emotions to those in the Attic 
corpus, and I use some of the speeches to the Athenian assembly for illustration.27 
Before the Peloponnesian War begins, Corcyran envoys plead for military aid from 
Athens against Corinth, and Corinthian envoys beg Athens not to provide it.  Both sides 
recognise they are asking Athens to judge a quarrel, and so there is a forensic element to this 
decision which will require arousal of appropriate emotions.  The Corcyrans admit that they 
cannot call on friendship and gratitude for past services, since they have not rendered any 
(1.32.1); they do attempt to arouse pity at the fate that awaits them if Corinth and its allies 
conquers them (32.5), and mention their great danger (33.1 and 35.3-4); and they arouse 
indignation at a Spartan unfairness that allows Corinth allies but not Corcyra (35.3). 
                                                 
23 Konstan (2006) 132, discussing Aristotle’s list of people we fear (Rh. 2.5, 1382a33-1382b18). 
24 Though, as mentioned earlier, the presence of some speeches by writers other than Demosthenes boosts confidence 
in these conclusions. 
25 Deliberative speeches reported at length are: Thuc. 1.32-6, 1.37-43, 1.68-71, 1.73-8, 1.80-5, 1.86, 1.120-4, 1.140-
4, 2.13 (in indirect speech), 2.60-4, 2.71, 3.9-14, 3.37-40, 3.42-8, 3.53-9, 3.61-7, 4.17-20, 4.59-64, 4.85-7, 4.98 (in 
indirect speech), 5.85-111 (in dialogue form), 6.9-14, 6.16-18, 6.20-3, 6.33-4, 6.36-40, 6.72 (in indirect speech), 
6.76-80, 6.82-7, 6.89-92, 7.11-15 (in letter form).  For a comprehensive list of speeches in Thucydides see West 
(1973). 
26 Scholars are quite reasonably troubled by the following statement at Thuc. 1.22.1: ‘I have found it difficult to 
remember the precise words used in the speeches which I listened to myself and my various informants have 
experienced the same difficulty; so my method has been, while keeping as closely as possible to the general sense of 
the words [ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης] that were actually used, to make the speakers say what, in my opinion, 
was called [τὰ δέοντα μάλιστ’ εἰπεῖν] for by each situation’; tr. Warner (1954) 47. 
27 Concentrating here on speeches at Athens provides the nearest comparison to the Attic corpus, and removes other 
potential variables that might arise from differing polis outlooks or value systems.  Thucydidean speeches to other 
cities’ assemblies (notably Sparta’s) do in fact use the same emotions, albeit weighted somewhat differently – as I 
discuss in my as-yet-unpublished papers ‘Different strokes for different folks’ (delivered at the European Social 
Science History Conference, 12th April 2012) and ‘Thucydides and emotional incitement to war’ (delivered at the 
Classical Association conference, 14th April 2014), both available on request. 
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However, these forensic-style arguments are presented only briefly.  The Corcyrans 
swiftly move on to draw attention to their naval skill, playing on Athens’ desire for gratitude 
from – or simply desire for – a client with a strong navy, which they will acquire painlessly and 
which will boost their military strength (32.5, 33.1-2, 35.5, 36.1).  The Corcyrans also play on 
fears of future wars – Sparta wants war with Athens, and so does Corinth, which attacked 
Corcyra first to neutralise its large navy (33.3); they should look at how the Corinthians are 
treating Corcyra, and not trust them (34.3); rejecting Corcyra will leave them weaker (36.1), and 
if Corinth conquers Corcyra their combined navy will rival Athens’s, so Athens should beware of 
allowing this (36.3).  As well as arousing fear of the consequences if their advice is not taken, 
they allay any fears of Spartan reprisals if it is (35.1, 36.1).  Finally, they cement their advantage 
by dangling before Athens secure routes to Italy and Sicily (36.2) – another desire argument.  In 
this speech fear is one of two emotions primarily played to, and the other is desire.  The latter is 
an emotion we do not see significantly in Demosthenes, whose prominence came at a period 
when Athens was mainly on the defensive; but it is clearly an element of Thucydides’ thesis that 
one of the causes of the war was Athenian rapacity, and we find this emotion played to several 
times in speeches at Athens. 
The Corinthian envoys, responding to the Corcyran speech, misjudge the Athenians and 
the context of the speech.  They overestimate Athens’s willingness to judge impartially and 
ignore its own benefit, so spend nearly half the speech trying to arouse indignation at Corcyran 
crimes (1.37.1-40.1), and another quarter playing on gratitude and friendship for their own 
support for Athens in the past (41.1-42.1, 43.1-2).  When they eventually turn to arguments that 
will arouse deliberative emotions – again desire and fear – they continue to get it wrong.  In 
discussing Corcyra’s crimes, they manage to reinforce Corcyra’s own arguments about the 
desirability of the alliance, mentioning its strategic position, wealth and huge navy (37.3, 38.5, 
42.4).  On the fear side, they threaten Athens with war (40.2-3, 42.2) and the dangers of 
encouraging subordinate allies to revolt (40.4-6) – but Corinth should be well aware that Athens 
is unlikely to be swayed by fear arguments alone, as they later instruct the Spartans about the 
Athenians’ hopeful, optimistic outlook (1.70),28 and indeed Athens votes for the Corcyran 
alliance. 
After Sparta declares war, the Athenians hold an assembly to discuss how to respond.  
Some argue for peace; however, the decisive speech is given by the politician Pericles.  He starts 
by ramping up anger and indignation at Sparta’s plotting, and preferring immediate war to 
arbitration (1.140.2).  He then plays on the Athenians’ pride at wanting to show themselves able 
to hold what they have without Spartan interference, and the shame they would feel at giving in 
to them and so appearing fearful and slavish (140.5-141.1).  This decreases the likelihood of his 
audience giving Spartan arguments a fair hearing, and ensures a receptive ear for what follows.  
He next – at great length – suppresses any fears of losing to Sparta, arguing that the Spartans are 
not suited to a long campaign nor one overseas due to having few money reserves (141.2-142.1), 
and explains how Athens can counter any threat (142.2-143.2).  This suppression of fear of the 
enemy is a good lead-in to what follows: arousal of confidence in Athens’s own naval abilities 
(142.3-5, 143.1, 143.3-5), as well as contempt for their opponents’ aversion to risk and lack of 
skill (142.7-8).  Finally, following a statement that the Athenians have many other grounds for 
hope for a good outcome (144.1: πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἔχω ἐς ἐλπίδα τοῦ περιέσεσθαι), he plays on 
pride at their ancestors’ achievements and desires for similar honour (144.3-4). 
                                                 
28 If someone is of a very optimistic disposition, it is necessary to show them why any particular hopes are unrealistic 
before they will be receptive to fear arguments.  Similarly when someone is in despair, you must give them back 
some hope before they will be amenable to confidence arguments – see below. 
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A year into the War, Athens’ hinterland had been invaded and devastated twice, and a 
plague had hit the overcrowded city, killing large numbers.  These enormous sufferings had 
brought a mood of despair (2.59.2: ἄποροι) and desire for peace.  Pericles speaks to dissuade 
them.29  He first attempts to suppress despair, by arguing that the plague is a one-off disaster 
while all the other problems were expected (61.2-62.1), so as to create receptiveness for what 
follows.  He next argues at length for confidence in eventual victory (62.1-3), as before coupling 
this with contempt for their opponents (62.3-4).  And eventually, having restored their optimism, 
he raises the spectre of what their subject states might do should they be freed (63.1-2) – a fear 
argument.  Concurrently, we find arguments designed to arouse shame at their irresolution (61.2) 
and falling below the standards of their fathers and losing what they already possess (62.3), and 
pride in being citizens of a great city whose past achievements and current glory they must live 
up to (61.4, 63.1, 64.2-3). 
Though Cleon treats his speech after the Mytilenian revolt in 427 as forensic, calling for 
orgê (see above) at their hubris and arguing for timôria (punishment), Diodotus’s response is 
instructive.  He explicitly draws a contrast between the lawcourt and the Assembly (3.44.4: ἡμεῖς 
δὲ οὐ δικαζόμεθα πρὸς αὐτούς, ὥστε τῶν δικαίων δεῖν, ἀλλὰ βουλευόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν), saying 
anger is unhelpful and inappropriate in deciding what to do in an Assembly: they must think of 
the future rather than the present (3.44.3: περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον βουλεύεσθαι ἢ τοῦ 
παρόντος), and how best to deter other cities from revolting.30  Raising this spectre constitutes a 
fear argument, and he continues to play on fear by discussing at length the problems with putting 
down future revolts if the precedent set is capital punishment for every citizen, not guilty as well 
as guilty (3.45-6). 
In 425, after the capture of Pylos, Spartan envoys came to Athens to sue for peace.  They 
first attempt to dampen the Athenians’ hopes for the future by arguing that the current Athenian 
military position is only due to good luck, which might change (4.17.4-18.3).  Once that hope (as 
they believe) has been dampened, they attempt to arouse fears that something will happen to 
cause unending enmity from Sparta, such that they will permanently lose the chance for peace 
(20.1). 
Ten years later, the Athenians debate an expedition to capture Sicily.  At the assembly 
meeting, two prominent politicians make speeches: Nicias, who is against the expedition; and 
Alcibiades, who is in favour.  Nicias tries to dissuade them by arousing fear of renewed warfare 
with Sparta if Athens divides and weakens its forces (6.10.2-4), of Sicily joining in on Sparta’s 
side (11.4-6), and of their being led astray by Alcibiades (12.2); and he tries to suppress what he 
calls their ‘duserôs’, their ‘sick desire’ (13.1).31  Alcibiades responds by suppressing fear of his 
youthful counsel and of Sicilian military power (17.1-3, 5-6), and arousing their contempt for the 
divided and disorganised Sicilians and confidence in an easy victory (17.3-4).  He ends with dire 
warnings of how Athens has grown so large it must keep growing or be conquered in turn (18.3), 
and that Athens will atrophy if it does not quickly throw itself back into war (18.6). 
We have found that the speeches Thucydides puts into the mouths of those addressing the 
Athenian Assembly use a similar palette of emotions to those in the Demosthenic corpus 75 years 
later.  This is not distinct to speeches addressed to Athenians.  In an appendix to this chapter, I 
give a rough and ready summary of the emotions played to in all deliberative speeches in 
                                                 
29 cf. the start of the First Philippic.  
30 See further Harris (2013) 104-5. 
31 Thucydides, commenting in his own voice, also describes the Athenians as feeling epithumia (appetite – often used 
in a sexual sense) and erôs for the expedition (6.24.2-3): they are so ‘turned on’ at the thought of acquiring Sicily, 
that their reason is completely overruled. 
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Thucydides.32  From this summary it can be seen that what I call the ‘deliberative emotions’ – 
fear, hope (and suppression of despair), confidence (and its adjunct contempt), desire, shame and 
pride – are the primary group of emotions aroused in deliberative oratory in order to persuade 
assemblies. 
However, unlike in Demosthenes’ deliberative speeches, where anger is the only forensic 
emotion that figures prominently, Thucydides’ deliberative speeches use five of the forensic 
emotions – anger, hatred, pity, gratitude and friendship – on a regular basis, if as a group less so 
than the deliberative emotions.  This suggests that judging other cities is an important part of 
deliberation.  However, Thucydides’ regular inclusion of forensic emotions is more nuanced than 
it appears on the surface.  First, the majority of his speeches are delivered to Athens or Sparta 
(the two strongest cities), and it is notable that the speeches delivered to other cities – cities 
without the power to sit in judgment – are generally more heavily biased towards the 
‘deliberative’ emotions.  It is also apparent that arguments designed to arouse friendship, hatred 
and gratitude are primarily made by visiting envoys (for obvious reasons), rather than by citizens 
of the addressed polis.  This explains why these three emotions are far more common in speeches 
reported in historiography than in the Attic corpus, where all deliberative speeches are made by 
citizens. 
We can further note that arguments appealing to forensic emotions are clustered heavily 
in a few speeches, notably: a) the Corinthian and Athenian speeches to Sparta (1.68-71, 1.73-8), 
and b) Cleon’s and Diodotus’s speeches after the Mytilenian revolt (3.37-40, 3.42-8), both pairs 
of which have strong elements of a trial about them; c) the Plataean and Theban speeches to 
Spartan generals (3.53-9, 3.61-7), which are forensic in all but name; and d) Alcibiades’ speech 
to Spartans (6.89-92), where he has to dispel high levels of hostility towards him personally 
before he can persuade them on policy.  Outside these speeches, the proportion of arguments 
appealing to forensic emotions again falls drastically. 
Finally, the disparity between these two sets of emotions, and particularly the 
predominance of fear arguments, is most apparent if one looks in detail at the longer speeches 
(which the table in my appendix does not do).  For example, Pericles’ speech at 2.60-4 
suppresses anger and rouses goodwill in chapter 60 only, while deliberative emotions are aroused 
in all four of the following chapters.  In Hermocrates’ appeal to the Sicilians at 4.59-64, fear and 
hope figure in all six chapters, though this only gives one X each in the table.  Nicias’s speech 
discussed earlier has fear arguments in five chapters, but hope and suppression of desire only in 
one.  And when Hermocrates addresses the Camarinaeans, fear arguments again appear in all five 
chapters, while pity, pride, shame and hope appear only in one each.  Taking these various factors 
into account, it should be clear that the emotions I have for convenience labelled ‘deliberative’ – 
and particularly fear – do indeed predominate in Thucydides’ deliberative speeches. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The evidence from both the Attic corpus and Thucydidean deliberative speeches shows that we 
can confidently posit fear (in particular), hope, confidence, contempt, shame, pride, and (in 
Thucydides at least) desire as the primary deliberative emotions – i.e. the emotions most 
important for an orator to arouse in an assembly, when trying to persuade them towards a 
particular course of action.  This is not to say that forensic emotions such as anger, pity or 
gratitude do not have a place; but when they do, it is generally in situations where the 
deliberation has a quasi-forensic aspect to it, i.e. when the deliberating city is in a position to 
                                                 
32 And some quasi-deliberative ones – e.g. where an army in the field has to make the decision, the army functions as 
a miniature assembly on the move. 
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judge and either reward or punish the city about which it is deliberating.  This is more obvious in 
Thucydides than the Attic corpus, which is not surprising given Athens’s relative weakness (i.e. 
inability to punish) in the mid-fourth century compared with the late fifth. 
I have postulated that the emotions that principally relate to deliberative oratory do so 
because they are primarily concerned with the future, and this is the time period most relevant to 
political deliberation.  This is based partly on evidence pieced together from Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 
and partly because this deduction seems to accord with common sense.  Thucydides provides 
corroborating evidence in Diodotus’s speech, where he explicitly chastises Cleon for arousing 
anger and talking about punishment, on the grounds that this is not a lawcourt (where such 
arguments would be appropriate) but an Assembly, where they need to consider what is best for 
the future; he continues by playing on fear – which I have shown is the most common 
deliberative emotion in Thucydides, Andocides 3 and the Demosthenic corpus’s deliberative 
speeches – rather than using forensic emotions (e.g suppressing anger or arousing pity), which 
might at first appear the more logical response to Cleon’s arguments. 
Finally, focusing (in the Attic corpus) primarily on the three Olynthiacs has shown that, 
even for three speeches delivered by the same person in similar circumstances only weeks apart, 
a range of very different emotional arguments are possible.  The First uses primarily fear and 
confidence/hope; the Third primarily civic pride and shame; while the Second, as well as hope 
and pride, plays with indignation and (uniquely in the Attic corpus) contempt.  This suggests that 
speakers would have had a wide range of emotional arguments they could choose from – albeit 
primarily from the deliberative emotions listed above – and situations did not necessarily demand 
one specific emotional response. 
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Appendix: Emotions aroused (or suppressed) in Thucydides’ deliberative speeches 
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1.32-36 Corcyran envoys Athenian Assembly X X X X X X X
1.37-43 Corinthian envoys Athenian Assembly X X X X X
1.53 Corinthian envoys Athenian army X
1.53 Athenian army Corinthian envoys X
1.68-71 Corinthian envoys Spartan Assembly X X X X X X X
1.73-78 Athenian envoys Spartan Assembly X X X X X X X
1.80-85 Archidamas Spartan Assembly X X X X
1.86 Sthenelaidas Spartan Assembly X X X X
1.90 Spartan envoys Athenian Assembly
1.90 Themistocles Athenian Assembly
1.91 Themistocles Spartan Assembly X
1.120-124 Corinthian envoys Spartan Assembly X X
1.140-144 Pericles Athenian Assembly X X X X X X
2.13 Pericles Athenian Assembly X X X
2.60-64 Pericles Athenian Assembly X X X X X X X X X
2.73 Plataians Plataians X X
3.9-14 Mytilenian envoys Peloponnesian Assembly X X X X X
3.30 Teutiaplus of Elis Peloponnesian generals X
3.37-40 Cleon Athenian Assembly X X X X X X
3.42-48 Diodotus Athenian Assembly X X X X X
3.52 Spartan envoys Plataian Assembly
3.53-59 Plataian envoys Spartan generals X X X X X X
3.61-67 Theban envoys Spartan generals X X X X X
3.71 Corcyran oligarchs Corcyran Assembly
4.17-20 Spartan envoys Athenian Assembly X X X X X X
4.21 Cleon Athenian Assembly X X
4.22 Cleon Athenian Assembly X
4.27 Cleon Athenian Assembly X
4.59-64 Hermocrates Sicilian assembly X X
4.85-87 Brasidas Acanthian Assembly X X X X X X
4.97 Boiotian envoy Athenian army X
4.98 Athenian envoy Boiotian army
4.120 Brasidas Scionian Assembly X X
5.85-111 Athenian envoys Melian Assembly X X X X
6.9-14 Nicias Athenian Assembly X X X
6.16-18 Alcibiades Athenian Assembly X X X X X X X
6.20-23 Nicias Athenian Assembly X
6.33-34 Hermocrates Syracusan Assembly X X X
6.36-40 Athenagoras Syracusan Assembly X X X X
6.72 Hermocrates Syracusan Assembly X X
6.76-80 Hermocrates Camarinaean Assembly X X X X X X X X
6.82-87 Athenian envoy Camarinaean Assembly X X X X X
6.89-92 Alcibiades Spartan Assembly X X X X X X X
7.11-15 Nicias Athenian Assembly X X X X
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